

author focuses on the years between 1961 and 1974 when, on the one hand, the religious field was still structured by a Concordat and Missionary Accord (which made the Catholic church hegemonic) and when, on the other hand, the structuration of the religious field began to decompose because of the divergence between church and state resulting from Vatican II and the beginning of the liberation war. The Jesuits' decision to focus on the elite came after two decades of evangelisation in the rural areas which brought few results. It was a return of the Society to its traditional activities. But it took place just when the state decided to take control of the instruction of the elite of the colony to counter the effects of the war. Hence the Jesuits' move was neither easy nor unproblematic. The author describes all the activities deployed by the missionaries as well as the contradictions and failures of these endeavours, not least because of a lack of support on the part of the state. Overall however, the Society of Jesus adapted and evolved and, the author concludes, it eventually succeeded in various spheres.

Jesuits are also at the centre of the fourth article. Nicholas Creary studies their perspectives on the formation of African clergy and religious men and women in colonial Zimbabwe (1922-1959). From the 1920s, the Vatican strongly favoured the formation of indigenous clergy as a means of supporting the missionary effort world-wide. Jesuit missionaries in Southern Rhodesia proved very reluctant to adopt this new method of evangelisation. They strongly resisted the promotion of Africans and delayed the transfer of leadership within women's religious orders and diocesan structures to African nuns and priests until after the Vatican II Council. The main reason for this, the author argues, was the Jesuits' own inculturation into White Rhodesian culture, or at least their adoption of its attitudes with regard to race. In that, he concludes, the Southern Rhodesian Jesuits' perspective was not very different from that of the Catholic Church in the USA.

Eric MORIER-GENOUD & Didier PÉCLARD

Serving the Kavango Sovereigns' Political Interests:

The Beginnings of the Catholic Mission in Northern Namibia¹

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The early colonial historiography of the Catholic mission in Namibia has been paid little attention to within scientific work so far. Despite the mission's influential role in the country's history for more than 100 years, scholars have concentrated on Protestant Lutheran missions, especially on the Finish Missionary Society (FMS), which was active in so-called Ovamboland, and above all on the German Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS), which became the dominant missionary organization in German South West Africa. This may be due to mainly two reasons: first, Protestant missionaries had begun their work in what is now Namibia many decades earlier than the Catholics. From 1806 onwards, missionaries from the London Missionary Society and later from the Wesleyan Missionary Society became active in the area along the Oranje River in southern Namibia. Both societies later had to abandon their mission field and transferred their rights to the RMS which had established its first mission in what was known as Great Namaland in

¹ This paper is based on my doctoral thesis on confrontation and co-operation in the Kavango region from 1891 to 1921 (Eckl 2003). Chapter II, in particular, deals with the events which led to the foundation of the Catholic missions in Kavango, while Chapter V investigates the political, social and economic interaction between the missionaries of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate and Kavango societies from 1903 to 1921.

1842.² Second, Protestant Lutheran missions had for a long time been working exclusively amongst the Nama and Herero people who, for various reasons, attract a great deal of academic interest and research in the history of Namibia's people.

This paper wants to shed some light on the early activities of the Catholic Mission in German South West Africa, especially on the establishment of the first Roman Catholic missions in the Kavango³ region in northern Namibia by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (O.M.I.) in 1910 and 1913, which created the basis for the dominant role played by the Catholic Church in the Kavango region today.⁴ Scientific research on the history of Kavango is still very scant, the crucial part of the Catholic missionaries in the colonial history of the region being no exception to this. The Kavango region in the far north of Namibia lies along the Kavango River where it forms the border between the former Portuguese Angola and German South West Africa. Until today it is inhabited mainly by five polities, namely from west to east by the Kwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu, Gciriku and Mbukushu (see map 2). Each of these polities was traditionally reigned by a sovereign whose indigenous title was *hompa* (among the Kwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu and Gciriku) and *fumu* (among the Mbukushu). They were elected for lifetime by their people, yet had to belong to a dynasty which was constituted on the basis of matrilineal succession laws.⁵


² Grotper (1994:291f, 434ff, 570f); Vedder (1985:192ff). See also Drießler (1932) and Menzel (1978) for the history of the RMS.

³ In colonial reports, the river, and hence the territory, was referred to as "Okavango". Since the prefix "O" is not common in Kavango languages, I use the term "Kavango" instead, in accordance with present-day official spelling. Similarly, the German spelling "Windhoek" is changed to "Windhoek" except for quotations and titles; the Mbukushu *Fumu's* name, in German colonial reports referred to as "Libebe", is changed to Diyeve; etc.

⁴ For a concise history of the early years of the Catholic Mission in German South West Africa, see the commemorative volume on the 50 years anniversary edited in 1946 (Apostolisches Vikariat 1946). This volume is especially of value for its extensive citations of sources, such as from missionaries' letters and diaries, which are otherwise not easily accessible. A comprehensive portrayal of the first 100 years of the Catholic Mission in South West Africa is given by Beris (1996). His volume, however, is mainly a collection of the various sources of the mission, and does not provide much analytical insights. Its real merit is that it is written in English, as almost all of the sources of the mission are in German.

⁵ See Gibson et al. (1981) for a description of the economic and socio-cultural way of life of the Kavango peoples.

Map 1. German South West Africa in 1907



Source: Schwabe, Kurd. *Der Krieg in Südwest-Afrika*. Berlin: C.A. Weller, 1907

For several years, Kavango societies resisted the foundation of a mission. After several failed attempts and the loss of five lives, the Roman Catholic Mission finally succeeded in establishing two permanent missions along the Kavango River bank, in Nyangana in 1910 and in Andara in 1913.⁶ In principle, all five Kavango peoples were politically independent, their sovereign's actual power was, however, subject to inner African rivalries which, as will be argued below, played a crucial role for the missionaries' options in the region. For example, a raid by the Tawana people living around Lake Ngami in British Bechuanaland on the Gciriku people in 1894 weakened the latter's military strength to such an extent that Gciriku *Hompa* Nyangana was hardly able to turn down a subsequent threat to his sovereignty by the Kwangali people. When his reign was additionally endangered by Portuguese colonial policy, the missionaries' presence was highly welcome to him. For similar reasons the establishment of a mission was also in the political interests of Mbukushu *Fumu* Diyeve II who had become a vassal of the Tawana sovereign after the death of Tawana sovereign Moremi II in 1890. In addition, *Fumu* Diyeve II had to defend his sovereignty against his rival, *Fumu* Mukoya, and was therefore susceptible to accept a mission for that purpose.

German colonial officials, and even more so the Catholic missionaries themselves, did not question why the Kavango sovereigns called for missions. They assessed Christianity to be so far more superior than other beliefs that this question never entered their minds. For them it was rather a matter of grace that African "pagans" wanted to be Christianised and follow the Christian way of life. Yet the failures and success of the missionaries' efforts were first and foremost dependent on the Kavango sovereigns' own interests and objectives. The ideas and expectations they had of missions are essential to understand why they finally consented to the establishment of missions in their territories. By considering the wider colonial context and inner African rivalries, this paper investigates the motivation of the Kavango sovereigns for their requests for missions, and argues that the establishment of the missions became possible primarily because they served the Kavango sovereigns' own political interests, for which the missionaries were only instruments. Hence, the focus of this paper is not on the history of Europeans in Africa, but rather on African history of the contact with European mis-

⁶ It took many years until the work of the Catholic missionaries in the Kavango region was expanded with the establishment of missions in Kwangali (1927), Mbunza (1929) and Sambyu (1930). These, however, will not be discussed here since they were located in a different colonial and political context.

sionaries. Before dealing with the objectives of the Kavango sovereigns, however, the early efforts of the Catholic missionaries in South West Africa and the establishment of the first two missions in the Kavango region need a brief description.

Early Catholic activities in South West Africa

Father Duparquet and his activities in Ovamboland

The history of the Catholic Mission in Namibia dates back to the time before the German Protectorate. In 1865 the Catholic Holy Ghost Congregation was entrusted with the huge area of the Apostolic prefecture Kongo, which included the territory of present-day Namibia. In 1878 Father Duparquet was ordered by Father Schwindenhammer, Superior-General of the congregation, to travel through the territory between the Kunene River in the north and the Oranje River in the south in order to investigate the possibility for establishing a Catholic mission.⁷ Coming from Cape Town, Duparquet arrived in Swakopmund at the end of September 1878 and travelled to Omaruru where, in February 1879, he founded a mission. As a result of his activities, the Apostolic prefecture of Cimbebasia, comprising southern Angola and most parts of Namibia, was established by an ecclesiastical decree on 28 April 1879. In 1879 and 1880 Duparquet undertook two journeys into Ovamboland where he received permission from local sovereigns to establish missions. The mission in Omaruru, however, which was intended to serve as a starting point for the expansion of the activities of the Catholic missionaries into Ovamboland, had to be abandoned in September 1881 when the missionaries were compelled by local Herero rulers to leave their country. Rivalries between Catholic and Rhenish missionaries, who had been active in Omaruru since 1867, seem to have played a crucial role in this. As a consequence, Duparquet founded a mission in Huila in Angola, from where, in July 1883, he started on his third journey to Ovamboland which resulted in the establishment of a provisional mission among the Kwanyama people. One year later, Father Delpuech together with the brothers Gerald and Lucius Rothaan started their missionary work there. The death of Kwanyama sovereign Nampadi in 1885, however, resulted in unrests during which all

⁷ Reports on Duparquet's travels were published in *Les Missions Catholiques* between 1879 and 1885. They were collated and translated by Mossolow in 1957 (see Duparquet 1957).

the missionaries were killed (Apostolisches Vikariat 1946:3-7; Beris 1996:9ff; Wüst 1941:145-147).

A short portrayal of the Oblates in German South West Africa until 1903

After these early failures among the Herero people and in Ovamboland, the Catholic missionary work in the northern parts of Namibia was placed into the hands of the Congregation of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate. Founded in 1816 by Eugène de Mazenod in France, the order had to find itself a new home after the closure of their mission in Paris by the French government in 1880 in the course of the anti-clerical *Klostersturm* (Scharsch 1953II:48ff). In 1885, a new home was founded near Valkenburg in the Netherlands. Only ten years later, as many as 195 young missionaries, many of them Germans, had been trained and prepared for their mission. As a result of the keen interest from Germany, the opening of a monastery in Germany was considered. The German government made its permission conditional on the order conducting missionary work in one of the German colonial territories. The Oblates acted accordingly and applied to the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, the Catholic committee of cardinals responsible for foreign missions, for a mission field in a German protectorate. On 7 December 1893, the *Congregatio* handed over the responsibility for the newly established prefecture Lower-Cimbebasia to the Oblates, and on 24 October 1894 the German government granted them the permission to establish a monastery in Hünfeld in the German diocese of Fulda (Apostolisches Vikariat 1946:8-16).⁸

Two years later, in December 1896, the first three O.M.I. missionaries from Germany arrived in Swakopmund to begin their work in German South West Africa. At the beginning, the scope of their activities was very limited and concentrated mainly on pastoral care for the few Catholics among the German soldiers and settlers in the Protectorate. The main objective for the Oblates' arrival – to do missionary work among the native people – was not easy to fulfil. Between 1880 and 1890 about 500 people

⁸ In 1888, the southern part of Cimbebasia, the so-called Great-Namaland, was separated from the prefecture Kongo and added to the prefecture Small-Namaland, which had been allocated to the Congregation of the Oblates of the Holy Franz from Sales. Lower-Cimbebasia was created on 25 July 1892, and roughly comprised the territory from the Kunene River up to but excluding the town of Rehoboth (Apostolisches Vikariat 1946:8). See especially Scharsch (1953) for an extensive study of the Oblates' history from 1816 to 1897.

from Bechuanaland had settled in the eastern part of the Protectorate. The establishment of missions in this area – in Aminuis in 1902 and in Epukiro in 1903 – was at least a start, but did not enable the missionaries to expand their work. Furthermore, the colonial government in Windhoek prohibited any kind of Catholic missionary work in the southern, central and north-western parts of the Protectorate among the Nama, Herero and Ovambo in order to prevent competing activities between different confessions amongst the African population.⁹ As a result, the Oblates were assigned the one area where Lutheran missionaries had not yet established themselves, the borderland in the far north where the Kavango River formed the frontier with Portuguese Angola, between Kuring-Kuru in the west and Andara in the east, a distance of roughly 430 kilometres (Apostolisches Vikariat 1946:14-16, 23-26).

There are two main reasons why no mission activity had been established in the Kavango region. First, it was quite a remote area. A journey to Kavango was difficult and dangerous. A particular problem was the crossing of the *Durststrecke* (literally, the stretch of thirst), a section of about 160 kilometres of mostly deep sands with no permanent water-holes. During the rainy season the sodden terrain became impassable and the depredations of the malaria carrying anopheles mosquito were an additional risk. The dry season confronted travellers with an even greater problem, the absence of water.¹⁰ Second, there were relatively few natives living along the Kavango banks. According to the first reliable estimate, there were 7000 to 8000 people living there in 1903,¹¹ all on the northern, Portuguese bank of the river. The Catholic missionaries soon realised what a difficult task the establishment of a mission in the north would be. The first three expeditions failed to reach their destination. After the second attempt failed in 1899, the Oblates' annual report noted: "As far as the founding of a mission in the north is

⁹ By that time, missionaries from the RMS were active among the Herero people in central Namibia, while the FMS had begun its work among the Ovambo people in northern Namibia.

¹⁰ *Landeshauptmann* Curt von François, the first German colonial officer to visit the Kavango region in 1891, concluded that the unfavourable water conditions along the road precluded a journey with ox-wagons to the Kavango during the dry season (François 1891:207). Later on, missionary expeditions favoured the dry season, mainly because of the better road conditions. For an evaluation of various routes to Kavango at the time of the German colonial regime, see Schweizer, *Die Zugänge zum östlichen Okavango und deren Durststrecken*, Neidsass, 24 April 1910. National Archives of Namibia (hereafter NAN), BGR F.9.b, p. 6; and Volkmann, no title, Grootfontein, 10 October 1911. NAN BGR F.9.b.

¹¹ Volkmann, *Bericht über eine Reise nach Andara am Okavango*, Grootfontein, 1 October 1903. BAB R 1001/1784, p. 61.

concerned, it presents difficulties unimaginable to anyone in Europe. In the first place, the area is completely unknown, and no one in South Africa knows what it is like up there."¹²

The first Catholic Mission expedition to reach the "destination of their hope and yearning" (Gotthardt 1927:21) took place in 1903. Yet, it resulted in a disaster.¹³ It had been initiated by a German colonial official by the name of Gerber who had privately visited Kwangali *Hompa* Himarwa in 1902.¹⁴ Gerber made the *Hompa* sign a "treaty" in which Himarwa declared that he wanted to have a mission. We do not know how they were able to communicate with each other, nor what Gerber actually told Himarwa, nor what kind of advantages the *Hompa* expected from a mission. Access to European goods may have been a crucial consideration (Laubschat 1903:681). By the time five missionaries finally arrived at Himarwa's residence on 18 March 1903 after a long and strenuous journey, the *Hompa* had changed his mind. Himarwa denied ever having signed a treaty and threatened to drive the missionaries away by force if they did not leave his territory voluntarily. Not surprisingly, different explanations were given for Himarwa's reaction. They range from Himarwa having been disappointed at not getting arms and ammunition,¹⁵ to Himarwa attempting to defend his independence, to anti-colonial resistance (Goldblatt 1971:194; Kampungu 1965:119f; Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:313).

Whatever the reasons for *Hompa* Himarwa's hostile behaviour might have been, the conditions the missionaries faced left no doubt that the es-

¹² 6. Jahresbericht der Missionäre Oblaten der Unbefleckten Jungfrau Maria, 1899:8 (all translations by the author). Nevertheless the head of the mission remained confident. The following annual report (1900:10) reads: "Its founding has been repeatedly delayed due to a lack of money; it should, however, be accomplished shortly."

¹³ Apart from later descriptions, there are two contemporary reports on the expedition of 1903, namely Hermandung (1903) and Fülling (1910). Father Gotthardt was not personally involved in this expedition, yet his description (1927) can be assumed to be based on personal reminiscences of those who had participated in the expedition. For a recent description and analysis of the 1903 events, see Eckl (2000).

¹⁴ Gerber had been ordered by the government to inspect the stock of trees in the northern parts of the Protectorate. His mission was explicitly limited to the non-populated areas and did not include Ovamboland or the Kavango region. He was free, however, privately to expand his explorations beyond this scope (Leutwein 1906:178; Leutwein – Kolonial-Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes, Windhuk, 28 August 1903. German Federal Archives (hereafter BAB), R 1001/2159, p. 118). Clearly, his visit to *Hompa* Himarwa was undertaken without instruction by or even knowledge of the Catholic Mission.

¹⁵ Volkmann – Gouvernement, Okahandya, 2 May 1903. BAB R 1001/1784, pp. 25f; see also Leutwein 1906:186.

tablishment of a mission amongst the Kwangali people was no longer possible. For this reason, Fathers Biegner and Hermandung went to see Nampadi, *hompa* of the Mbunza, a neighbouring people living east to the Kwangali. *Hompa* Nampadi first expressed his willingness to have a mission, but later on sent a message saying that Himarwa had threatened him with war if he allowed the missionaries to settle in his territory.¹⁶ The missionaries, who in the meantime had all fallen sick with malaria, had no choice but to head for home. On 17 April, one month after they had arrived at Himarwa's residence, Father Biegner died of malaria, while a second missionary, Brother Reinhardt, died on 21 August in Windhoek. The attempt of 1903 had not only failed but had also resulted in the loss of two lives (Eckl 2000:41-43).


Richard Volkmann, District Commissioner of Grootfontein and the Kavango Region, reacted to the hostile behaviour of Himarwa with an unauthorised "*Strafexpedition*" (expedition of punishment) against *Hompa* Himarwa and his people who resided on the Portuguese side of the river. When Governor Leutwein received notice of Volkmann's plans, he was concerned that this could lead to tensions with the Portuguese colonial administration and immediately proscribed any infringement of the Portuguese territory.¹⁷ The letter reached Volkmann only after he had already carried out his hostile action against Himarwa. Yet, since the *Hompa's* residence was on the opposite, Portuguese, bank of the river, Volkmann had had to make do with firing across the river and, therefore, could not have caused much harm (Eckl 2000:44ff). As for the missionaries, the disaster clearly showed that any attempt to establish a mission along the Kavango River could only be effective if it was supported by the African peoples, especially by the *hompa* himself. Of course, the Oblates did not give up the idea of doing missionary work along the Kavango River, as Father Nachtwey, head of the mission, pathetically wrote in the annual report: "We are in great need, help us, and help us quickly. We are determined to die rather than give up the new mission."¹⁸

¹⁶ Nampadi knew very well that this was not only a verbal threat but a real danger, since only three years earlier Himarwa had waged war against the Mbunza (Wüst 1941:8f).

¹⁷ Leutwein – Volkmann, Windhoek, 2 July 1903. BAB R 1001/1784, p. 30.

¹⁸ 10. Jahresbericht der Missionäre Oblaten der Unbefleckten Jungfrau Maria, 1903:7f.

Map 2. The Kavango region. Main locations and polities



© 2004 · Cartography: Monika Feinen

The establishment of the Nyangana Mission in 1910 and the Andara Mission in 1913¹⁹

Failure in Andara 1908/09

After their experiences with *Hompa* Himarwa, the missionaries tried to make sure that they would be accepted by the Kavango sovereigns before they undertook another attempt. Father Nachtwey, together with Father Hermandung and Brother Bast, the latter two having been members of the expedition to Himarwa, joined Volkmann on his *Strafexpedition*. After shelling Himarwa's residence, the expedition travelled down the Kavango River visiting all local sovereigns except *Hompa* Nyangana. The Oblates used this expedition to investigate other possibilities for founding a mission. On 12 August 1903 Volkmann and Nachtwey were welcomed by the Mbukushu *Fumu*, Diyeve II, who consented to the establishment of a mission which was arranged for the following year. Due to the colonial wars against the Herero and Nama people from January 1904 onwards,²⁰ however, the founding of the mission in Andara had to be postponed indefinitely. It was only in mid-1907 that Father Krist and Father Lauer undertook a journey to Andara in order to contact Diyeve II and to negotiate about a mission. Four months later, after having travelled more than 2000 kilometres, they were back in Windhoek. All in all the result of the journey was considered positive: *Fumu* Diyeve II had remembered the promise he had given in 1903 and had affirmed it.²¹

The first expedition to Diyeve II which was undertaken in August 1908 had to turn back 100 kilometres north of Grootfontein when the thicket became too dense and the roads too sandy. Only after the administration in

¹⁹ The geographical names "Nyangana" and "Andara" are both the result of colonial naming practices. The names of *Hompa* Nyangana and *Fumu* Ndara were attributed to the respective locations of their royal residences. The place where Nyangana Mission was established had previously been known as Kandenga (Mutorwa 1996:16), while Andara Mission was named after *Fumu* Ndara who resided on Sibanana island (see Gotthardt 1914:174; Wüst 1941:80).

²⁰ For a discussion of the colonial wars, see the reader edited by Zimmerer and Zeller (2003).

²¹ There are contemporary reports on that journey by Lauer (Okavango-Fahrt über Gobabis, Rietfontein, Tsau, Ndara. Windhuk, 6 January 1908. AAW, Okavango Gründungsversuche; see also Lauer 1908 and Wüst 1941:11-46) and by Krist (Bericht über die Missionsreise der R.R.P.P. Krist & Lauer Windhuk – Libebe (Andara) am Okavango vom 11. Juli bis 20. November 1907. Döbra, 23 December 1907. AAW, Okavango Gründungsversuche, which was partially published as Krist 1914).

Grootfontein had cut a path, and after the missionaries had limited their baggage to the indispensable, a second expedition succeeded in getting through to Andara. Father Lauer, Father Krist, Brother Langehenke and Kurz, a bricklayer and carpenter working for the mission, arrived in Andara on 6 January 1909. About three weeks later, on 27 January, Krist and Langehenke left Andara for Grootfontein in order to return with additional supplies and equipment. Only Langehenke made it to Grootfontein. Father Krist died of malaria on 9 February about 220 kilometres north of Grootfontein. Extraordinarily heavy rains throughout the rainy season of 1908/09 prevented the missionaries from travelling back to Andara immediately. It only became possible at the end of April 1909. When Brother Langehenke, together with Brother Rust and Father Gotthardt, arrived at Andara on 29 May, they found that both Lauer and Kurz, who had remained behind in Andara, had died.²² A diary by Lauer left no doubt that both had died a natural death and had not been murdered by the Mbukushu, as the missionaries had first thought.²³

The weeks to come were characterised by ongoing negotiations between the missionaries and the *Fumu* dealing with a variety of questions. Brother Langehenke remembered: "Meetings took place almost daily, during which, on all sorts of pretexts, new difficulties continued to be raised."²⁴ In his reminiscences, Father Gotthardt (1927:57ff) gave some examples of the disputes by which the Mbukushu tried to benefit as much as possible. One controversy erupted about the guns which had been in the possession of Lauer and Kurz. *Fumu* Diyeve II argued that the guns had become his own property after the missionaries' deaths and persistently refused to return them, a standpoint the missionaries had to accept for the time being. The most serious dispute, however, arose out of a mere accident. A Mbukushu man, accompanying Brother Langehenke to Grootfontein, was wounded by a grazing shot after lions had attacked the camp on the second night of their journey. Back in Andara, the *Fumu* heard the case, fined the missionaries £10 and demanded the gun. The *Fumu* vehemently insisted on his demand; Fa-

²² Gotthardt 1910b:18; 1927:44-49; Gotthardt, Bericht über die letzte Missionsreise nach d. Okavango 28 IV – 28 VIII 1909. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 1, pp. 200-203; Gotthardt, Bericht über den Stand der Okavango-Mission, Ndara, 1 July 1909. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 2, p. 210.

²³ Lauer's original diary is missing. It is, however, quoted by Wüst (1934a; 1941:91-110). A handwritten copy of the diary by Gotthardt is found in "Okavango Gründungsversuche" (AAW).

²⁴ Langehenke in Wüst 1941:83.

ther Gotthardt, in turn, accepted the fine but equally vehemently refused to hand over the gun in question. Finally, *Fumu* Diyeve II instructed the people working for the mission to stop doing so and expelled the missionaries from his territory. The relationship between *Fumu* Diyeve II and the missionaries was disrupted to such an extent by this series of persisting controversies that there was no way of mediating further. The missionaries, taking into consideration all their experiences with *Fumu* Diyeve II and the Mbukushu, no longer believed that a successful establishment of a mission was possible and decided to resign and leave Andara. When the *Fumu* realised that the missionaries were indeed going to leave, he changed his mind and tried to persuade them to stay. But even the presenting of a leopard skin was in vain. Six weeks after their arrival, the missionaries left Andara on 15 July 1909. Another attempt to establish a mission had failed, another three missionaries had died (Gotthardt 1927:57ff, 1910b:71ff, Beris 1996:219ff).

Hompa Nyangana and the Catholic Mission

The Catholic Mission did not give up its objective despite this new setback. It next attempted to establish a mission one year later, on the invitation of Gciriku *Hompa* Nyangana. Nyangana had become *hompa* of the Gciriku around 1866 (Mutorwa 1996:45). German colonial officers, adventurers and missionaries alike considered him a cruel and despotic African ruler. One of the main reasons for this judgement was his involvement in the killing of a German settler family travelling along the Kavango, the Paasch family, in 1903, which had caused shock and indignation not only in the Protectorate, but also in Germany (Eckl 2000:52 ff.). As a consequence of this incident, whites travelling along the Kavango River avoided getting in contact with the Gciriku *Hompa*.

The very first meeting between *Hompa* Nyangana and the Catholic missionaries took place only at the end of January 1909, after the missionaries had begun to establish the mission at the residence of *Fumu* Diyeve II in Andara. Nyangana, together with his son Mbambo and two counsellors, visited Father Krist and Brother Langehenke while they were passing through his territory on their way from Andara to Grootfontein. According to Brother Langehenke (as cited in Wüst 1941:85), *Hompa* Nyangana had asked Father Krist to send him and his people some "teachers" as well. This request was not commented upon by the missionaries. A few months later, Nyangana's son Mbambo visited the missionaries at Andara. He clearly

came for trading reasons (Gotthardt 1927:65), but he also discussed the possibility of establishing a mission at Nyangana, one which Gotthardt assessed quite optimistically.²⁵

It was only after the failure in Andara, however, that the idea of founding a mission in Nyangana's area was considered concretely. When the missionaries passed through Gciriku territory on their way from Andara back to Grootfontein, *Hompa* Nyangana approached the missionaries again and came to see them in their camp on 19 July 1909.²⁶ *Hompa* Nyangana listened to what the missionaries had to tell about their experiences in Andara, and repeatedly expressed his lack of understanding for the way they had been treated by *Fumu* Diyeve II. He then invited the missionaries to stay with him, and emphasised his sincerity by promising to build them a house and even to support them with food. The missionaries, however, were not prepared to accept this offer as they had to consult the mission's superior in Windhoek first. *Hompa* Nyangana insisted that some of his people accompany the missionaries. They should help them on the journey and should not return before they had requested the "big teacher" in Windhoek to send teachers. *Hompa* Nyangana promised to welcome these like his own children (Gotthardt 1927:75ff).

Three young Gciriku accompanied the missionaries to Windhoek and were later hosted on the mission farm Döbra near Windhoek.²⁷ The news of the death of Father Lauer and Kurz caused great consternation among the Oblates (Gotthardt 1927:79). The distressing experiences of the previous years and the loss of five lives led to intense reflection on the attempts undertaken so far and on future steps to be taken. Father Gotthardt played a crucial role in convincing the mission's superiors in German South West Africa and in Rome that the Kavango mission should not be abandoned. After analysing all the mistakes which had been made and after carefully considering all the risks and chances, his "*Denkschrift über die Okavango-Mission*" concludes with an urgent plea for another attempt in Nyangana:

²⁵ Gotthardt, Bericht über den Stand der Okavango-Mission, Ndara, 1 July 1909. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 2, pp. 212 f.

²⁶ The missionaries left Andara on 15 July 1909, the meeting with *Hompa* Nyangana taking place four days later (Gotthardt 1910b:124).

²⁷ The Gciriku spent eight months on Döbra where they were taught Otjherero, the Herero language, so that they would later be able to act as interpreters between the missionaries and the Gciriku people.

Based on what has been said we have to adhere to the Okavango mission. The sacrifices of material resources are not expected to be too high, and whether human sacrifices will be demanded, God only knows. In any case, they are not necessarily a requisite of establishing a mission. We should not wait too long as this would make sovereign Nyangana suspicious and give others the opportunity to enter this mission field before us and to reap where we have sown.²⁸

Of course, Gotthardt's concern that "others" might be faster than the Catholics once more refers to the Protestant missions. Gotthardt's remark was sparked off by a plan by the German colonial administration to establish a post at the Kavango, a plan which was indeed realised in June 1910 when a police post was opened in Kuring-Kuru.²⁹ It was in particular this concern which convinced the mission's superior, Father Klaeyle, to agree to a new attempt.³⁰ Two fathers and three brothers left Grootfontein on 18 April 1910 and arrived in Nyangana on 21 May, where they were welcomed by *Hompa* Nyangana and his son Mbambo.³¹ The first service was celebrated on the next day, attended by *Hompa* Nyangana and many of his people. The Catholic Mission, therefore, considered 22 May 1910 as the founding date of Nyangana Mission (CHN, p. 4; Bierfert 1911; Gotthardt 1911:10-13, 1927:80-86). *Hompa* Nyangana and his son Mbambo supported the mission

²⁸ Ap. Präfektur Windhuk, Denkschrift über die Okavango-Mission. No date. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 2, p. 218.

²⁹ The police post of Kuring-Kuru, which was established in reaction to Portuguese colonial occupation, mainly served the interest of national prestige. Contrary to the Portuguese forts, Kuring-Kuru was a mere symbolic gesture which had no considerable impact on the people of the Kavango, nor on the circumstances under which the missionaries were operating in the area. Catholic missionaries never asked for any intervention of the colonial state in the area, but rather considered colonialism as obstructive to their own intentions. This point of view is illustrated in a judgement by Father Bierfert who, in 1912, assessed the prospects of the missionaries' work very positively, exactly because there was not yet any colonial influence on the region: "The people on the Okavango have until now been mostly spared from certain bad influences from the Whites. [...] As a result, the best possible opportunity exists for the real conversion of the peoples of the Okavango. In this situation, it is still easy to convince the people, as they do not yet hold any prejudice against us" (Bierfert, Windhoek, 5 December 1912. AAW, Nyangana Briefe und Akten I).

³⁰ Klaeyle explained his decision in the Catholic Mission's annual report: "Should others be able to get ahead of us, now after the Catholic Mission has brought such immense sacrifice in resources and previous human lives? This consideration was decisive." (XVII. Jahres-Bericht für die Mitglieder des Marianischen Missions-Vereins, 1910:23f). The General of the Oblates in Rome raised no objections against this, but sent a telegram saying "Expedition your affair" (P. Dozois. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 2, p. 221).

³¹ The expedition consisted of Fathers Gotthardt and August Bierfert, and Brothers Georg Ruß, Johannes Rau and Konrad Heckmann. They were accompanied by the Gciriku men whom *Hompa* Nyangana had sent to Windhoek in July 1909.

to a great extent. After several failed attempts, the foundation for the first permanent Kavango mission had thus been laid: "A turn-about took place for the mission which had until then been harshly tested. [...] Nyangana welcomed the missionaries most hospitably and has since shown them his sincere benevolence in all possible respects."³²

The conclusive foundation of the Andara Mission

In July 1910, only two months after the Nyangana Mission had been established, Diyeve II sent messengers to the missionaries asking them to return to Andara (Gotthardt 1910a:133). Of course, the *Fumu's* request delighted the missionaries who had always been hoping to go back to Andara. The missionaries, however, did not show their satisfaction to the *Fumu*, but rather told him that there were still "big stones" which he had to remove first. If the missionaries were to return to Andara, the *Fumu* should consider it a favour being done to him. In January 1911, the *Fumu's* messengers were back in Nyangana, bringing with them two cows and a leopard skin as presents for the missionaries. Father Gotthardt, however, insisted on the return of the two contentious guns which had belonged to the deceased Lauer and Kurz and which Diyeve II had vehemently refused to hand over in 1909 (Gotthardt 1911:18, 1927:97f).

This time it took longer for the messengers to return, but finally Diyeve II decided to give in and to hand over the guns. The barrel of one was burst, for which the *Fumu* sent a heifer as compensation. Thus the ground was prepared for new negotiations. Early in November 1912 Father Gotthardt visited *Fumu* Diyeve II in Andara where the conditions for a new attempt were laid down at a public meeting. The re-occupation of Andara Mission was arranged for the end of the rainy season of the following year. In April 1913 the *Fumu* sent three boats to Nyangana for Father Gotthardt and Brother Heckmann to travel to Andara (Gotthardt 1914). Father Gotthardt later noted in the Mission's chronicle: "We arrived on the 27th and were given a hospitable welcome. Libebe's attitude was now very different from former times and we were given a free hand to do whatever we wanted."³³ Finally, Andara Mission was established.

³² Eugen Klaeyle, "Zur Okawango-Affäre," *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 26 November 1911; see also Klaeyle 1912:168.

³³ Provincial Archives O.M.I., CHA, p. 5f. Libebe is the spelling used in German reports for Diyeve. For the question of transcription, see footnote 3.

The Kavango sovereigns' reasons for calling for missions

In his monumental thesis on "One hundred years of mission by the Catholic Church in Namibia", Beris explains the change of attitude by *Fumu* Diyeve II towards the mission by the fact that "Diyeve had realised his unjust behaviour" (Beris 1996:229). This explanation is not at all satisfactory. Obviously Diyeve II was in need of support and was pursuing his own plans. As soon as the missionaries had left Andara in July 1909, the *Fumu* had tried to get the backing of the German colonial administration. In July 1911 he even made a written submission to the German governor, asking him to establish a police post at Andara. For various reasons, however, this was never done, and the German policeman who had been stationed at Andara in July 1911 was withdrawn a short time later (Eckl 2003:167ff). It was in this context that Diyeve II had changed his attitude and gave the missionaries *carte blanche* "to do whatever they wanted", as Gotthardt put it.

This brings us to the critical question: why did *Hompa* Nyangana and *Fumu* Diyeve II not just accept the mission, but go so far as to plead for the setting up of a mission? This behaviour seems even more surprising due to the fact that the German colonial war against the Herero in 1904 had badly affected the Germans' image. The Kavango peoples had not been involved in that war, but knew very well what had been going on in the south. Some of the Herero who fled the war had come to the Kavango. These Herero had warned the Kavango people about the Germans and strongly advised them against missionaries.³⁴ Wüst remarked: "The people were more or less informed about the recent Herero war. The Herero had used this war to teach some of our people: first the missionaries arrive, then the police comes and takes away your land, just as they did with us."³⁵ Both sovereigns later told the missionaries that Herero had warned them from accepting a mission. Father Bierfert, for example, remembered that *Hompa* Nyangana once told him:

He then related at great length that, several years earlier, a multitude of Wa-herero had travelled through his country after the unlucky war with the Germans and had warned him about the missionaries, lest the same thing happen

³⁴ The 1911/12 annual report of Grootfontein district stated that "over and over again the Herero who fled to the Kavango spread, and believed, the old myth of the dangerous Germans" (Jahresbericht Grootfontein 1911/12. NAN ZBU A.VIA.4. (Vol. 1), p. 3b).

³⁵ Wüst 1934b:67f. The same attitude and belief was observed by Father Gotthardt during his six week stay in Andara in 1909 (see Gotthardt 1910b:21).

to him as had happened to them. They too had welcomed the missionaries, but then the soldiers came and took their land away.³⁶

It is true that Diyeve II had initially consented to the establishment of a mission when he was visited by Nachtwey and Volkmann in 1903, subsequent to the punitive expedition against *Hompa* Himarwa and his people which had been undertaken mainly because of their resistance to the missionaries. In this situation, the *Fumu* may have deemed it wiser to agree to the mission rather than to refuse it. Diyeve II's acceptance of a mission, however, cannot be explained merely by fear, as he confirmed his decision in 1907. As for *Hompa* Nyangana, the circumstances under which he had addressed the missionaries and was asking for a mission suggest that his decision was based on rivalry with *Fumu* Diyeve II. But again, rivalry between the *Hompa* and the *Fumu*, which indeed did exist, is not a satisfactory explanation.

The same holds true for the argument that the sovereigns accepted the missionaries for the economic advantages these would bring. It is possible that the sovereigns' expectations of material benefits and access to European goods and merchandise had an important impact on their decisions concerning the acceptance of a mission. In particular the behaviour of *Fumu* Diyeve II during the missionaries' stay in Andara in June and July 1909 clearly showed his intention to take this chance of gaining the biggest material benefit possible. Due to the remoteness of the Kavango area, there were only few Portuguese traders serving the Kavango peoples' demands for goods, and chances for trade were scarce. Volkmann, after a journey to the Kavango in 1901, even linked the lack of trade relations to the peoples' wish for a mission.³⁷ It is safe to assume that the same holds true for the Mbukushu, and even more so for the Gciriku who had been rather isolated in terms of trade.³⁸ There can be absolutely no doubt that the Kavango people would

³⁶ Bierfert 1938:23. *Fumu* Diyeve told Father Lauer about a similar warning: "The Hereros, he said, had been severely punished there, and while travelling through they said: Don't let the Germans into your land, because within three [?] years you will have nothing left and even less say in your own land" (Lauer – Schemmer, Ndara, 20 January 1909. Archives of the Archdiocese of Windhoek (hereafter AAW), Okavango Gründungsversuche).

³⁷ Richard Volkmann – Kaiserliches Gouvernement, [Bericht] über eine Dienstreise in den nördlichen Teil des Distrikts, Grootfontein, 22 July 1901, p. 15. NAN BGR F.9.b. The same opinion was expressed by Laubschat who had accompanied Gerber on his visit to *Hompa* Himarwa in 1902 (see Laubschat 1903).

³⁸ While the Kwangali entertained trade relations into Ovamboland (Siiskonen 1990:84f) and the Mbukushu were trading with their northern neighbours in the Barotse Kingdom (Schulz and Hammar 1897:171; Schulz 1885:383), the Gciriku had been quite isolated in terms of trade. Not

have regarded all missionaries above all as traders. Even Gotthardt was not under any illusion about this when he reported to the mission's head in Windhoek, after having spent only a few days in Andara: "I have to admit that they are primarily interested in a store, and for the time being see us as shopkeepers rather than as teachers. But we might be partially to blame for this, as we started this."³⁹ The same estimation was made by a German colonial official with regard to *Hompa* Nyangana. *Bezirks.samtammann* Schultze met the *Hompa* only a few days after Nyangana had explicitly expressed his wish for a mission, and reported as follows: "Nyangana's words did not make clear whether he wanted a missionary or a merchant; he said he wanted a teacher from whom he could purchase blankets etc."⁴⁰

Regardless of how tempting the prospects of material benefits were, they would hardly have compensated the potential disadvantages of a mission, just like the Herero had warned. The influence of access to European goods on the decisions of the sovereigns should not, therefore, be overestimated. In any case, according to observations by, or rather presumptions of, colonial officials and missionaries, the goods which were most sought after by the Kavango sovereigns were guns, ammunition and horses – items which were not part of the missionaries' merchandise anyway.⁴¹ Furthermore, the example of *Hompa* Himarwa who resisted the establishment of a mission clearly shows that expectations of economic benefits were not sufficient an argument for accepting a mission.

Taking these points into consideration, it becomes clear that the sovereigns must have been guided by ideas other than those already discussed. It thus seems worthwhile to ask why *Hompa* Nyangana and *Fumu* Diyeve II wanted a mission. What expectations did they have with regard to a mission outpost? It is only possible to find an answer to this question if we leave the

only would they have to cross the Mbukushu territory, but they would also have to move into the territory of the Tawana which, for reasons discussed below, was associated with uneasy memories.

³⁹ Gotthardt, Bericht über den Stand der Okavango-Mission, Ndara, 1 July 1909. Röm. Archiv O.M.I., Dt. Provinz in D.S.W., Vol. 2, p. 211. This is but one example of many illustrating this point.

⁴⁰ Schultze, [Travel report 12.7.-9.9.1909]. BAB R 1001/2161, p. 266.

⁴¹ *Fumu* Diyeve II, for example, is said to have asked Brother Langehenke, about to leave for Grootfontein, to "bring along a trader who sells guns, horses and gunpowder" (Gotthardt 1927:66). Volkmann's assumption that Himarwa had signed a treaty on the establishment of a mission only in the hope of gaining access to guns and ammunition is another example (Volkmann – Gouvernement, Okahandya, 2 May 1903. BAB R 1001/1784, p. 25b).

European point of view and try, instead, to take the Africans' perspective. The sovereigns' decisions cannot be traced to a single motive alone, but were based on a variety of considerations which can best be termed "political interests".

The political interests of Fumu Diyeve II and the Catholic Mission

Fumu Diyeve II was facing two serious problems which he hoped to overcome with the assistance of the Catholic Mission. One of these problems was a rivalry between him and Mukoya concerning the supremacy over the Mbukushu people. Diyeve II's predecessor was *Fumu* Dimbu I, also known as *Fumu* Andara. Before *Fumu* Andara died around 1895 (Wüst 1941:30), he had chosen Diyeve as his successor. By doing so he disregarded Mukoya, whose claim to the throne, by right of birth, was stronger than Diyeve's. Mukoya did not accept *Fumu* Andara's decision, but moved into Angola with his supporters, where he settled on the Luyana River. Thus, the Mbukushu split up and from then on lived scattered across three colonial empires. Most remained with Diyeve II and settled in German South West Africa and British Bechuanaland, whilst the rest lived in Portuguese controlled Angola and regarded Mukoya as the rightful sovereign of the Mbukushu.⁴²

To overcome his rival Diyeve II, Mukoya formed an alliance with *Hompa* Nyangana. Thus, Diyeve II was threatened by two adversaries. *Hompa* Nyangana had raided Diyeve II's residence once before. This happened shortly after Diyeve II had become *fumu*, when his reign was not yet stable. As a consequence, *Fumu* Diyeve II moved his residence from Sibana island to Tahoé island, where rapids protected him from unwelcome visitors (Wüst 1932:25). Until his death in September 1915, the reign of *Fumu* Diyeve II was permanently threatened by Mukoya's claim to supremacy. In this situation, Diyeve II hoped for the support of the German missionaries. If there were a mission in Andara, the missionaries, without doubt, would not tolerate Mukoya waging war against Diyeve II; rather, the missionaries' interests would have been an argument for German military intervention. For the *Fumu*, having a mission thus meant to be protected from Mukoya's intrigues.

⁴² Wüst 1941:30, 98; Streitwolf, Bericht über meine Reise zu Libebe am Okavango, Sesheke, 13 November 1909. NAN A 536 Caprivi Strip, pp. 21f; see also Streitwolf 1911a:191-211, 1911b.

When the first attempt to establish a mission had been given up by the missionaries in July 1909, and the *Fumu*'s plan failed, at least for the time being, Diyeve II tried to get rid of his rivals Nyangana and Mukoya with the help of the German colonial administration. By the end of September 1909, Kurt Streitwolf, the German Resident Commissioner in the Caprivi Strip, came to Andara. During talks with him, Diyeve II accused Nyangana and Mukoya of having been responsible for the deaths of Kurz and Lauer. Their idea, Diyeve II said, was to blame him for the murder of the missionaries so that the Germans would come and kill him and Mukoya could take his place. A third missionary, according to the *Fumu*, had been poisoned by Nyangana on his way back to Grootfontein.⁴³ Of course, Streitwolf did not believe this story, but recognised Diyeve II's intention to deal his rivals a blow. However, the story Diyeve II told clearly shows how the *Fumu* tried to instrumentalise the Catholic Mission and the German administration alike for his dispute with Mukoya.

A second, even more serious danger to the power of *Fumu* Diyeve II was his and his people's dependence on the Tawana, who claimed supremacy over the Mbukushu since the death of the Tawana *Kgosi* Moremi II.⁴⁴ The predecessor of Diyeve II, *Fumu* Andara, had concluded an agreement with Moremi II in 1885, stipulating that those Mbukushu living in Ngamiland were to be considered as Andara's subjects despite of them living on Tawana territory. When Moremi II died in 1890, his successor, Sekgoma Letsholathebe, did not accept this agreement.⁴⁵ He is quoted as saying: "Moreme is dead and Andara is dead; their treaty is dead also" (Gibbons 1904 I:215).⁴⁶ Sekgoma claimed supremacy over the Mbukushu people and, from 1896 onwards, forced them to pay heavy tribute in kind. The Tawana even took Mbukushu as slaves. The young *Fumu* Diyeve II himself once tried to resist Tawana reprisals and was subsequently captured and tied up by a Tawana. He was about to be deported when he was lucky enough to es-

⁴³ Streitwolf, Bericht über meine Reise zu Libebe am Okavango. Sesheke, 13 November 1909. NAN A 536 Caprivi Strip, p. 23bf.

⁴⁴ *Kgosi* is an indigenous title for the Tawana king. See Tlou (1985:32-36) for a brief description of the Tawana kingdom with special reference to social and political aspects.

⁴⁵ Sekgoma acted as an interim administrator until the rightful successor to Moremi II, his son Mathiba, reached the age of maturity in 1906 (Tlou 1985:139).

⁴⁶ Note that though the date of *Fumu* Andara's death is not definitely known, Wüst estimated that it took place in approximately 1895 (Wüst 1941:30, 80). The quotation here, however, suggests that *Fumu* Andara was already dead when Moremi died in 1890.

cape with the help of his servants during a night rest (Wüst 1941:122f, 1932:28-30; Fisch 1983:62).

In 1909 the situation was still the same. In connection with conversations he had had in December 1908 and March 1909 with Mathiba, Moremi's son and successor of Sekgoma, Resident Commissioner Streitwolf reported that Mathiba openly claimed the Mbukushu territory as his own property. The extent to which Diyeve II and his people were actually suffering from Tawana influence is not easy to assess. *Fumu* Diyeve II complained heavily about Tawana influence and behaviour. The *Bezirksamtman* of Grootfontein, Schultze, for example, who met with Diyeve II just a few days after the missionaries had left in July 1909, reported:

After several introductory remarks, Libebe suddenly started to complain heavily about the tyranny of the Bechuana. Two years earlier they had raided two of his villages, every year they were demanding a large tribute in the form of livestock and grain. He was not prepared to tolerate this and I should help him do away with the yoke of the Bechuana.⁴⁷

It seems as if the complaints of Diyeve II were well justified. When Streitwolf stayed in Andara in September 1909, he was supposed to meet with Mathiba and the British magistrate from Tsau, Lieutenant Hanny, in order to settle the border dispute. Both were unable to come. Mathiba, however, sent a letter to Diyeve II saying that both he and the magistrate would come later and would then talk about the border. In any case, he did not care much about the border himself and stated: "Libebe belonged to him, and whoever wanted to eat Libebe had to eat Matibi first."⁴⁸ This message left no doubt as to what kind of a relationship existed between *Fumu* Diyeve and the Tawana *Kgosi* Mathiba. As a response, Streitwolf sent the British magistrate a letter prohibiting him and Mathiba from entering German territory, which meant that they should not interfere in the reign of Diyeve II. When Streitwolf was back in Andara in early 1911, he expressed the opinion that it was due to his letter that Diyeve II's dependence on Mathiba had come to an end and that no Tawana had entered the *Fumu's* territory since.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Schultze, [Expeditionsbericht 12.7.-9.9.1909]. BAB R 1001/2161, pp. 272f. Diyeve II asked Schultze for horses, guns and ammunition so that he could defend himself against the Tawana, a request which Schultze, of course, turned down.

⁴⁸ Streitwolf, Bericht über meine Reise zu Libebe am Okavango. Sesheke, 13 November 1909. NAN A 536 Caprivi Strip, p. 23.

⁴⁹ Streitwolf, Das Deutsche Okavangogebiet, seine Bevölkerung und seine Verwaltung, Grootfontein, 1 February 1911. BAB R 100/2184, pp. 130f.

Yet, when Streitwolf's successor as Resident Commissioner, Viktor von Frankenberg, came to see Diyeve II in July 1911, he found two Tawana messengers whom he suspected of collecting tribute from the Mbukushu:

Most of all, the English Bechuana continuously harass the Mbukushu. If Captain Streitwolf believed that a simple warning would bring it to an end, then he was mistaken. In fact, the Bechuana tax-collectors were just about to start their work when I appeared at the Okavango. [...] Apart from grain and animal skins, the Bechuana help themselves to women and slaves from the Mbukushu, be it for their own use or in order to sell. According to Libebe, they recently captured a woman from his own family.⁵⁰

Von Frankenberg had not met the messengers personally but had seen their provisional shelter. All the Mbukushu whom von Frankenberg asked whether they had paid taxes or not answered in the negative. Von Frankenberg, however, had no doubt that these people were not telling the truth and tried to explain their answers as follows: if the Mbukushu would not pay the taxes, they would get into trouble with the Tawana; yet, if they confessed to him that they had indeed paid the taxes, they would get into trouble with him and, after he left, with the Tawana as well. So the best way for them to act was to pay and not to complain about it.⁵¹

Whether von Frankenberg's hypothesis was right or not, there can be no doubt that Diyeve II and his people were being troubled by the Tawana in one way or another. As in relation to the threat by Mukoya, the establishment of a mission would have been a possible way for the *Fumu* to end his dependent relationship with the Tawana. Clearly, this was also how Tawana *Kgosi* Mathiba, who considered a German mission in Andara as a threat to his own influence over the Mbukushu people, assessed the situation. Mathiba was definitely not in favour of a German Catholic mission among the Mbukushu, and followed the missionaries' activities in Andara very closely. When, in 1907, Lauer and Krist had travelled to Diyeve II in order to find out if the *Fumu* still consented to a mission as had been agreed upon in 1903, they travelled via Tsau in British Bechuanaland, the town of Mathiba's residence. Thus, Mathiba knew about the missionaries' plan. A diary which was kept by Father Krist (1914) is revealing with regard to Mathiba's reaction. The *Kgosi* had ordered two men to accompany the mis-

⁵⁰ Von Frankenberg – Bandhauer, Schuckmannsburg, 30 August 1911. BAB R 1001/1809, pp. 24bf. See also von Frankenberg – Gouvernement, Libebe, 16 July 1911. BAB R 1001/1808, p. 193.

⁵¹ Von Frankenberg – Bandhauer, Schuckmannsburg, 30 August 1911. BAB R 1001/1809, p. 25.

sionaries: Takatschuane, who acted as guide and interpreter, and Motschulapeko, who, according to Krist, was a member of the London Missionary Society and who had been instructed to counteract the missionaries' purpose.

Meeting the Oblates in the company of Mathiba's messengers was obviously an awkward situation for *Fumu* Diyeve II. Krist noted in his diary that while Diyeve II was opening a letter from the mission's superior Nachtwey, the *Fumu* addressed the Tawana, telling them the "big teacher" had said that he would send him presents, but that he had not mentioned that the missionaries intended to stay with him. Yet he, Diyeve II, would welcome white teachers if they were sent by Mathiba. This statement was a shock to the missionaries (Krist 1914:410). Father Lauer remembered the meeting with the *Fumu* in a similar way:

This one [one of Mathiba's messengers] began to speak and spoke harshly against all whites for quite some time, mentioned Samuel Mahaherero and praised the one leader as their proper teacher. After that, the two old ministers also spoke, confirming that Libebe and Nyangana had from long ago been vassals of Matibi and that that was the reason why they could not decide on anything other than what was approved by Matibi. "Yes", Libebe replied, "what Matibi agrees to, we will also agree to." The whole success of founding [a mission] was therefore dependent on Matibi's approval.⁵²

Obviously the Tawana had also been instructed to ensure that the missionaries and the *Fumu* did not meet without them (Wüst 1941:31). Krist, however, managed to meet the *Fumu* alone. Communication without interpreter was difficult, yet during the meeting Father Krist noticed an "unquestionable corresponding conviction" (Krist 1914:463) and therefore had no doubt at all that Diyeve II would welcome the establishment of a mission. The *Fumu*, Krist believed, had only behaved the way he had because of the presence of the Tawana guides. On 24 June, when Lauer and Krist had left Andara, Mathiba sent a revealing note to Diyeve II. It reads as follows:

Concerning Libebe. Libebe is still one of us. You are a subject to the Country of the Treaty, the Country of the Government. He is [you are] to send the tribute here, to Matiba, King of Lake-Ngami-Land. Up until now it has not come to an end, i.e. he belongs to no other country than the Country of the Government, i.e. he is in Matiba's power. If the German tribe comes, called "Germen", he is to resist and tell them that up to now he belongs to the country of Matiba alone. Then he is to look for a teacher to help him, and a

⁵² Lauer – Präfekt, Windhoek, 28 November 1907. AAW, Okavango Gründungsversuche; see also Beris 1996:211.

store. But all this emerges from the power of King Matiba Moremi. If this is requested, the King will take care that the wishes are fulfilled. That is the news I had to report. I am King Matiba Moremi. So I say, saying that I am still about to come, if you do so, you, Libebe. I am Matiba Moremi.⁵³

This letter clearly indicates that Mathiba not only subsumed Diyeve II under his own authority, but also that he saw the establishment of a German mission as a danger to his own influence. Later, when the Oblates started to build a mission in Andara, Mathiba still tried to prevent it. On 15 June 1909, two weeks after Gotthardt, Ruß and Langehenke had arrived in Andara, a Tawana legation arrived. Mathiba had ordered them to find out whether there were Whites residing with Diyeve II, and whether they were only on a visit or intended to stay. Father Gotthardt told them that they were about to build a mission in Andara. By doing so, he acted against the *Fumu*'s explicit wishes. In anticipation of the legation, the *Fumu*, according to Gotthardt, "increasingly seemed to lose his proud self-confidence" and had implored the missionaries "by the spirits of his ancestor" not to tell the Tawana that they had been invited by him (Gotthardt 1927:64). Father Gotthardt's statement led to a fierce dispute between Diyeve II and the Tawana legation as to who was reigning over the country. Anyway, the legation was not entitled to take any action but merely had to report to Mathiba. It stayed for two weeks and then returned to Tsau.

We do not know how Mathiba received the report and whether he took any measures or not. Klaeyle, head of the Catholic Mission in German South West Africa, attributed the failure of the mission at Andara to Diyeve II's dependency on the Tawana and blamed Mathiba for the fact that the missionaries had to leave Andara.⁵⁴ This interpretation, however, was contradicted by Brother Ruß who was told by the Tawana messengers that they had not been instructed by Mathiba to stir up Diyeve II against the missionaries, but that, in their view, the missionaries would voluntarily withdraw from Andara since the Mbukushu were all rogues (Wüst 1941:119). While the extent of Mathiba's responsibility for the behaviour of *Fumu* Diyeve II, and thus for the missionaries' failure of 1909, is uncertain, there can be no

⁵³ Gotthardt 1927:63f. Mathiba's note was translated and sent to the Mission's superior by Lauer (Lauer – Schemmer, Ndara, 20 January 1909. AAW, Okavango Gründungsversuche; see also Beris 1996:219). A photographic rendition of the letter in Beris (1996:235) shows that the German translation as well as the Setswana version were written by the same person, i.e. both texts were transcribed by Lauer. Thus, no original of the document exists.

⁵⁴ Eugen Klaeyle, "Zur Okavango-Affäre," *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 26 November 1911; see also Klaeyle 1912:167.

doubt, however, that Mbukushu dependency on the Tawana played a crucial role in the *Fumu*'s willingness to have a mission at Andara.

Hompa Nyangana's political interests and the Catholic Mission

Apart from access to European goods and merchandise, the main motives for *Fumu* Diyeve II to call for a mission were to consolidate his power and to gain his full independence from the Tawana. The problems which made *Hompa* Nyangana want a mission were similar: he, too, was in fear of his power and independence. Nyangana's position was threatened from two different sides: from his western neighbours, the Kwangali people, and from the colonial powers, mainly the Portuguese. As for the threat from the Kwangali, there are two events to be mentioned: the so-called massacre of Lishora posed an indirect threat, and the consequences of a quarrel over succession in Kwangali a direct one.

In the massacre of Lishora in 1894, the Tawana had killed almost all adolescent Gciriku men.⁵⁵ The background for it was a long-lasting enmity between *Hompa* Nyangana and Kanyetu, one of the *hompas* of the Sambyu people who were neighbours of the Gciriku.⁵⁶ While there had always been conflicts between them, the situation escalated when Kanyetu married one of Nyangana's wives who had run away. *Hompa* Nyangana sent a messenger to the Tawana *kgosi*, Moremi, asking for military support against Kanyetu. Yet, it was only after Moremi's death in 1890 that Nyangana's appeal was heeded. Sekgoma, the interim ruler of the Tawana kingdom, was one of two commanders of the Tawana army when it first fought Kanyetu and then massacred the Gciriku people. We do not know whether Sekgoma acted in response to Nyangana's plea or whether he was pursuing his own plan from the very beginning.⁵⁷ In any case, the Tawana army attacked Kanyetu's resi-

⁵⁵ The eldest reports of the massacre are given by Father Bierfert (1925:215) and Father Wüst (1932:13-24; 1941:29f). An extensive discussion of the event is Fisch (1983), whose paper is mainly based on a Gciriku chronicle which was published by Fleisch and Möhlig (2002:57-122, especially pp. 93-98). See also Shiremo (2002), who recently dealt with the topic. See Fisch (1983:64-66) for difficulties in dating the event which is likely to have happened either in 1893 or 1894.

⁵⁶ Kanyetu was one of three Sambyu *hompa*. After the death of *Hompa* Kandima in 1874, the Sambyu people were reigned by her three sons, Chiabe, Mbambangandu and Kanyetu, who shared power.

⁵⁷ The sources are contradictory as to what led Sekgoma to fight Kanyetu and later Nyangana. Most probably *Hompa* Nyangana had asked for military support for a second time (Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:96; Bierfert 1925:215; Wüst 1932:17, 1941:29). According to contemporary Euro-

dence on the Kwito island Malyo and finally captured it, but suffered heavy casualties in the process. Beside traditional weapons, Kanyetu and his people only had ten guns at hand for their defence. These, however, had been positioned so strategically that no Tawana could set foot on the island until the ammunition of the defenders had run out and Kanyetu had killed his companions, his son and himself.

According to Fisch (1983:55), the unfavourable course of the attack, which resulted in heavy casualties, was the reason for the subsequent massacre of the Gciriku, who had not participated in the battle against Kanyetu themselves. In order to take revenge, the Tawana spread a rumour that they were in possession of a mighty magic called *Peku* which made them bullet proof. They offered to treat the Gciriku with the magic. As a result, *Hompa* Nyangana called all his men who were fit for military service for that purpose. The men were told to lay down all their weapons because otherwise the magic would not work. When the Gciriku had done as they were told, most of them were easily massacred by the Tawana. The political, social and economic consequences of the massacre were fatal. Shiremo (2002:34), for example, estimates that about forty per cent of the Gciriku people were killed at Lishora. The villages were looted, and *Hompa* Nyangana and his son Mbambo were deported to Tsau.⁵⁸

After Nyangana was released again, he and his people remained vassals to the Tawana and had to pay tribute to them (Shiremo 2002:35; Mutorwa 1996:13; Fisch 1983:58; Gibson 1981b:164).⁵⁹ We do not know how long this dependent relationship lasted and whether Nyangana's wish for a mission – like in the case of the Mbukushu – has to be seen in this context as an attempt to end Tawana influence. It is likely, however, that by the time the mission in Nyangana was established, the Gciriku had already gained independence from the Tawana.⁶⁰ The consequences of the Lishora massacre for

pean travellers, however, Sekgoma waged war against Nyangana at the instigation of white traders who were plotting revenge for the alleged murder by Nyangana of a Boer trader by the name of Wiese (Passarge 1905:230; see also Fisch 1983:52).

⁵⁸ We do not know how long Nyangana and Mbambo had to stay in Tsau. Oral traditions vary between six and eighteen months in this respect (Fisch 1983:65). They were set free due to the intervention of a British official.

⁵⁹ For contemporary sources concerning the Gciriku's dependence on the Tawana, see Passarge (1905:709-714) and Eggers – Gouvernement, Bericht über meinen Zug nach Karakuwisa und den Okawango, Otavi, 27 November 1899. NAN BGR F.9.b, as well as Eggers (1900:185).

⁶⁰ There is good evidence that the situation had changed with Mathiba's reign from 1906 onwards. Nyangana's son, Mbambo, and Mathiba had become friends during Mbambo's stay in

the establishment of a mission had only been indirect: not only had most of the young Gciriku men been killed in 1894, but the Gciriku had lost all their firearms.⁶¹ As a consequence of Lishora, the Gciriku military force was extremely weakened and they would not have been able to defend themselves in the case of an attack. The massacre of Lishora, therefore, resulted in Nyangana's wish for missionaries as guarantors of security and stability. This was even more the case since Gciriku independence was endangered at just the time that *Hompa* Nyangana had formulated his request for a mission by a serious dispute over succession in Kwangali.

The three persons entitled to succeed *Hompa* Himarwa in Kwangali were the *Hompa*'s nephew, Kandjimi Hauwanga, Kandjimi's elder brother Sirongo, and Kandjimi's cousin, Siteketa za Hairua. In order to make sure that he would be the future *hompa*, Kandjimi Hauwanga first killed his brother Sirongo and, in 1909, his cousin Siteketa (Kampungu 1965:229, 354). The killing of Siteketa is reported by Wüst (1932:25-27) and is mentioned in various oral traditions.⁶² For our line of argumentation, a critical evaluation of all the sources and a detailed reconstruction of the events which led to Siteketa's death is not necessary. The main point here is, rather, to show that the circumstances of Siteketa's death can be understood as a threat to *Hompa* Nyangana's rule and possibly influenced Nyangana's attitude towards the mission. Siteketa had already been fleeing from *Hompa* Himarwa for several years when he finally took refuge with *Hompa* Nyangana and even married the *Hompa*'s daughter Mavanze (Wüst 1932:25; Kampungu 1965:222-224; Mangondo in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:223). Later on, however, tensions arose between Siteketa and Nyangana because Siteketa, as a Kwangali prince, did not want to submit to Nyangana's rule:

But then their brother, that Siteketa, was picking up bad manners over time. He was also like a soldier. He did not listen. He did not recognise and obey the

Tsau where both had been taught by an English missionary. Mbambo was even married to Mathiba's sister, Shirudi (Mutorwa 1996:16f).

⁶¹ Father Bierfert, for example, reported in connection with a meeting with Nyangana that the *Hompa* was surrounded by some 50 men who were all armed with a lance, a dagger or a spear (Bierfert 1911:229), but who were obviously not in possession of firearms.

⁶² Kampungu first recorded two oral traditions that deal with the death of Siteketa: the "Masianic Account according to Simbombo alone" (Kampungu 1965:207-237) and the "Mangondolian Account" (Kampungu 1965:238-375). Both must be considered personal reminiscences rather than oral traditions in the sense of Vansina (1985). The "Mangondolian Account" was re-edited by Fleisch and Möhlig (2002:179-230). A third account, which can be considered an oral tradition, was told by Michael Kativa Sirongo and was recorded in 1996 (see Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:233-271).

laws of chief Nyangana not to kill. He said to me that means nothing. He was supposed to pay tribute to the chief, but he said: "I am a chief, too; I can not pay to the chief's residence[?]. He would simply kill elephants [without permission of the chief]. Even the trunk of the elephant, he would not take it to the chief's residence. Then he said to Nyangana: "If you are disobedient, I will kill you and then we take all the country to be Ukwangali; the Mbunza and the Shambu will be our vassals. That side is Kandjimi's, this side is mine[?]. He [=Nyangana] heard that, and then he, Siteketa, even took Nyangana's daughter and married her. (Sirongo in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:259f)

According to the oral tradition quoted, Siteketa not only resisted the orders of *Hompa* Nyangana, but openly questioned his authority, and threatened to kill the *Hompa* and incorporate Gciriku territory into the Kwangali kingdom. In this portrayal, even Siteketa's marriage to Nyangana's daughter was meant to demonstrate his disdain for Nyangana. Oral traditions have it that it was Nyangana himself who, out of fear for his authority, plotted and schemed against Siteketa. Nyangana bribed messengers whom Kandjimi had sent to Siteketa, so that they reported false messages to Kandjimi. The message which led to the war between Kandjimi and Siteketa read, in Mangondo's account: "Siteketa was repeatedly boasting: 'The ground hornbill develops wings, we and Hauwanga will fight each other.' Kandjimi heard this and thereupon he became very furious" (Mangondo in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:225).⁶³

As a result, Kandjimi waged war against Siteketa and killed his cousin on Gciriku territory.⁶⁴ Thus, *Hompa* Nyangana managed to get rid of Siteketa and to avert a direct threat to his authority, without having to kill Siteketa himself and thereby provoking a war with the Kwangali. He did not, however, achieve his actual intention, the consolidation of his rule, since, after Siteketa's death, he was shown the same kind of disrespect by Kandjimi Hauwanga. Two events serve to illustrate this point. First, oral traditions have it that Kandjimi let his horse graze in Nyangana's fields: "Kandjimi came riding on his horse with the name 'Mbambi' of which they say: 'Mbambi in the reeds / in the fields of Nyangana / it walked slowly'" (Man-

⁶³ The message, according to Simbombo's account, reads as follows: "The cause of waging war against Siteketa had been his boasting saying: "The black carnivorous Bird is growing wings and spurs and will soon be a fullfledged fighter, you cannot match" (Kampungu 1965:221). See also Sirongo in Fleisch and Möhlig (2002:260f).

⁶⁴ According to Wüst (1932:26), Siteketa jumped into the Kavango River and drowned. See Sirongo in Fleisch and Möhlig (2002:262-269) for an extensive description of the course of the war.

gondo in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:226).⁶⁵ This behaviour can only be seen as a clear affront and provocation. Second, Kandjimi demonstrated his superiority and power over Nyangana by blaming the war on Nyangana, and making him pay cattle for the mourning ceremony:

Kandjimi then said: "Go to Nyangana's place [and tell him] that he shall give some pieces of cattle for the mourning ceremony, because it is his fault that I killed my brother Siteketa, he kept sending those messages of the hornbill developing wings[?]. Nyangana out of fear gave the cattle to be slaughtered for the mourning celebrations of Siteketa. His horse ate in the field of Nyangana. (Mangondo in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:228)⁶⁶

This passage clearly illustrates Nyangana's relationship with Kandjimi: *Hompa* Nyangana had no choice but to give the cattle as requested by Kandjimi. Their relative strength is concisely expressed by the one sentence: "His horse ate in the field of Nyangana." Whether this is merely a metaphorical expression or not, the behaviour of the Kwangali princes Siteketa za Hairua and, later, Kandjimi Hauwanga was a distinct threat to the existence of an independent Gciriku kingdom. In this respect it is insignificant whether the war between Kandjimi and Siteketa was triggered by *Hompa* Nyangana or not; *Hompa* Nyangana's call for a mission most probably occurred out of political calculation. He realised that the mission was an excellent ally against the Kwangali threat. This was even more the case as, for two reasons, *Hompa* Nyangana could not count on the assistance of the German administration in case he were attacked. First, before 1910, German colonial officers had hardly any clue as to what was happening along the Kavango River. Second, *Hompa* Nyangana's reputation within German colonial circles was very poor.

As already mentioned above, *Hompa* Nyangana, together with the Sambyu *hompa*, Mbambangandu I, had been blamed for the murder of several European travellers;⁶⁷ the most serious offence of which they had been ac-

⁶⁵ Kampungu recorded the following praise poem for Kandjimi's horse, Mbambi: "Mbambi m'etewa m'epia lia Nyangana, tazi gendi sipoerera. Mbambi in the reeds, in Nyangana's field, the stealthy runner" (1965:226). Elsewhere, Kampungu adds that Kandjimi's "warriors must have been numerous enough to terrify even Nyangana" (Kampungu 1965:356).

⁶⁶ The same story was told by Simbombo: "When all had come back, Kandjimi sent word to Nyangana that he should give cattle to be slaughtered for mourning of Siteketa. 'It is your fault', he said, 'that I have killed my brother Siteketa'. Out of fear for Kandjimi, Nyangana donated the demanded head of cattle" (Kampungu 1965:226).

⁶⁷ For the offences of which *Hompa* Nyangana was accused, see Volkman – Leutwein, Grootfontein, 2 September 1903. BAB R 1001/1784, pp. 36f.; Zawada, Bericht über den Verlauf der Okavango-Expedition November 09, Namutoni, 12 December 1909. BAB R 1001/2184, p. 26b; and de Almeida 1912:195.

cused was the murder of the Paasch family in 1903 (Eckl 2000:52-59). Except for a poor reputation, the Sambyu and Gciriku people had not faced severe consequences for the Paasch incident until 1909, when the colonial situation in Kavango all of a sudden changed completely. Until 1909, German colonial influence in the Kavango region was very sporadic and limited to few expeditions, while the Portuguese had no influence in the area at all. In August 1909, however, a Portuguese colonial army consisting of more than 500 men converged in the Kavango region and, within just two months, established five fortified military posts along the river stretching from the Kwangali to the Mbukushu territory (de Almeida 1912:186-206; Pélissier 1969:88-92; Singelmann 1911). The German administration reacted by the setting up a police post in Kuring-Kuru. This was intended to demonstrate the German colonial claim to the region, but was not meant to exert any kind of influence or control over the Kavango people. The Portuguese objectives, however, were completely contrary to those of the Germans. The Portuguese were eager to control the people effectively and to set up a colonial regime by compulsion and force. Both the Kwangali *Hompa*, Kandjimi Hauwanga, and the Mbunza *Hompa*, Karupu, were captured for no reason, though both managed to escape the Portuguese and subsequently settled on the southern, German river bank. Most of the Kavango people followed their example and fled Portuguese taxes, forced labour and despotic rule. By the end of 1910, more than half of the Kavango people who, up to then, had been exclusively living on the Portuguese side had crossed the river and settled on the German side.⁶⁸

Yet, while the Kwangali and Mbunza people could easily move to German territory, this was not an option for the Sambyu people. The Portuguese had planned military action against the Sambyu people with the consent of the German administration because of the Paasch incident of 1903. The Sambyu had no choice but to leave their home along the Kavango River and to go into exile into inner Angola up to where Portuguese influence had not yet reached.⁶⁹ For *Hompa* Nyangana and the Gciriku people there was only one way out if they did not want to share the fate of the

⁶⁸ See, *inter alia*, reports by von Zastrow and Streitwolf (Von Zastrow, Bericht über die Okavangoexpedition, Grootfontein, 24 January 1911. BAB R 1001/2184, pp. 116bff; Streitwolf, Das Deutsche Okavangogebiet, seine Bevölkerung und seine Verwaltung, Grootfontein, 1 February 1911. BAB R 100/2184, pp. 128ff).

⁶⁹ Zawada, Die Portugiesen, ihre Tätigkeit am Okavango und mein Verkehr mit ihnen, Namutoni, 9 September 1909. NAN ZBU J.XIII.b.4 (Vol. 3), p. 154; de Almeida 1912:189ff; Haushiku in Fleisch and Möhlig 2002:159f, 163-165.

Sambyu: the *Hompa* had to improve his reputation in order to make sure that the Germans would not prohibit him and his people from crossing the river just like most of the Kwangali and Mbunza people had done. The best chance to secure a benevolent attitude by the Germans was to welcome the establishment of a mission, especially after the missionaries' efforts in Kwangali and Mbukushu territory had failed so dramatically. In this sense, the Portuguese colonial invasion of the Kavango region in 1909 is crucial for *Hompa* Nyangana's attitude towards the Catholic Mission among his people.

Conclusion

The beginnings of the Catholic Mission's activities in the Kavango region show that the missionaries' failures and success depended on the Kavango sovereigns' attitudes and behaviour towards them. While the missionaries never really questioned the sovereigns' motivations to act the way they did, they were actually serving the interests of the African rulers by establishing missions in Nyangana and in Andara in 1910 and 1913 respectively. *Hompa* Himarwa, who had successfully resisted the missionaries in 1903, just as much as *Fumu* Diyeve II and *Hompa* Nyangana, were all pursuing their own objectives. For the Kavango sovereigns, resisting or welcoming the missionaries was mainly a matter of keeping or gaining their independence, and of strengthening their own traditional authority as rulers. On the one side, *Hompa* Himarwa and his nephew and successor Kandjimi Hauwanga had not been threatened by any foreign power or kingdom, thus the acceptance of a mission in 1903 would have been a danger to their independence, rather than a welcomed support. It is very unlikely that Kandjimi would have resisted a mission after August 1909 when the Portuguese occupied the Kavango region. In any case, he and his people welcomed the establishment of a German police post in Kuring-Kuru in 1910. On the other side, the establishment of a mission in Andara as well as in Nyangana was to a great extent made possible by inner African rivalries and wars. The beginnings of the Catholic Mission in the Kavango region, therefore, can serve as an example of how African rulers, competing for power and supremacy, sought co-operation with colonial forces, and thus contributed to the creation of ideal conditions for the establishment and expansion of colonial spheres of power (Albertini 1970:15).

Only two years after the Catholic Mission in Andara was permanently established, *Fumu* Diyeve II died in September 1915. It was mainly his suc-

cessor, *Fumu* Disho, who gained from Diyeve II's decision to accept a mission. While no Tawana influence whatsoever on the Mbukushu people living in the far north-east of German South West Africa is reported from then on, the missionaries effectively acted as advocates for the *Fumu*'s attempts to prevent *Fumu* Mukoya from interfering with his authority. In 1916 *Fumu* Mukoya moved from inner Angola to the Kavango River where he was welcomed by his friend and ally *Hompa* Nyangana. Until his death in 1921, *Fumu* Mukoya troubled *Fumu* Disho with his plan of moving back to Sibanana island where *Fumu* Andara's residence had once been. This move would have meant nothing other than war between the two parties. The missionaries interfered several times with *Fumu* Mukoya's plans by reporting to the British and Portuguese colonial administrations and urgently asking them to stop Mukoya in order to prevent a military dispute (Wüst 1934b:47, 86, 131f; 1935:371; CHA, pp. 22, 25).

As for *Hompa* Nyangana, he had achieved his objectives just as Diyeve II had done. On the one hand, he clearly recognised his chance to gain the missionaries as allies against the Kwangali and Kandjimi Hauwanga's threat of expanding his sphere of power. On the other hand, the missionaries acted as intermediaries with the German colonial administration and hence made his move to the southern side of the river, in reaction to Portuguese policy, possible. When the missionaries were about to leave Andara, *Hompa* Nyangana took his chance. It was exactly in this situation that *Hompa* Nyangana nearly convinced the missionaries to establish a mission within his territory. It is true that at the time that *Hompa* Nyangana first formulated his plea for a mission, he could not yet have known about future Portuguese colonial occupation. But, as shown above, Nyangana had another good reason to call for a mission. The presence, however, of Catholic missionaries – seen against the background of Portuguese colonial policy – became even more urgent after August 1909. The argument that Nyangana, *inter alia*, had called for a mission in order to be able to move to German territory is clearly supported by the fact that the *Hompa* and half of his people did indeed move onto the southern river bank immediately after the missionaries started to build a mission in May 1910 (Mutorwa 1996:16). The Catholic Mission attributed the Gciriku's move to the southern river bank to their own influence, and by doing so obviously intended to demonstrate the Catholic Mission's positive role in developing the Protectorate by attracting new German

subjects.⁷⁰ This, apparently, was a misinterpretation: the move by the Gciriku onto German territory was *not* a consequence of the establishment of a mission and the efforts of the missionaries, but the existence of a mission was a necessary prerequisite for that move.

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⁷⁰ The Catholic Mission's superior, Klaeyle, for example, stated in a newspaper article: "It has to be attributed to the influence of the mission that the tribe is now exclusively living on the German side of the river" (Eugen Klaeyle, Zur Okavango-Affäre, Kölnische Volkszeitung, 26 November 1911; for similar statements, see also Klaeyle (1912:171) and the Jahresbericht der Katholischen Mission der Patres Oblaten M.I. in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (nördlicher und mittlerer Teil), 1 April 1911 – 31 March 1912. NAN ZBU A.VI.a.4, p. 3).

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